Page Eight

The Grinnoll REPORTER

 

Civilian government in Vietnam?
the generals still Ila/ll the cards

By Howard Motfett
The Collegiate Press Service

El). NOTE: Howard Moffett, 1565‘
66 editor of the Yale Daily News.
has, for several months, been a full-
time correspondent in South Vietnam
for the Collegiate Press Service is the
second of a series of reports to air
pear in the Reporier.

SAIGON, South Vietnam (CPS) --
American oiiicials, the press, and Vict-
namese politicians are setting the stage
hero for a dramatic transfer of power
from military junta to elected civilian

Government, South Viet Nam's new-

constitution will be ready by the end
of March. in April local elections will
be held in an estimated 39 per cent
of the country’s hamlets. By September
the nation may have a duly elected
president.

The Constituent Assembly in down-
town Saigon buzzes with energetic
speeches. Hopeful politicians say the
new Constitution could be the first step
toward true democracy — if the mil-
itary will guarantee honest elections.
-American officials talk of a “new pt»
lltical atmosphere,” and point to the
temporary blocs in the Assembly as
the seeds of future political parties.
The American press is already focus-
fng on possible candidates for the
presidency.

Military runs Vietnam

But make no mistake, the military
still runs South Vietnam. Beneath the
surface of Civilian politicking there are
clear signs that the generals intend to
play a dominant role icr some time
to come.

No one is better qualified to speak
for South Vietnam’s military establish
ment than Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu.
At 42 the French-trained Thieu is Chief
of State, Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, and Chairman of the
Ionian National Leadership Committee
(or junta) by whose grace Air Vice
Marshal Ky governs. Thieu is a small
man, \vith a bright young face devoid
of Wrinkles. Yet his Voice is heavy
and authoritative, and he puffs oc<
casionally on an impressive English
pipe with a leather-covered bowl. His
finest hour in combat came when, as
a colonel, he commanded the troops
that assaulted Diem’s palace in the
1963 Revolution.

General Thieu spent almost an hour
this afternoon.talking off the cuff in
his wellrappoinled office at General
Staff Headquarters. what emerged was
a pretty clear picture of how the gem
erals size up the Current excitement
about civilian rule. In brief, they aren’t
nearly as excited about it as the
civilians.

Underlying everything he said was
one idea: South Vietnam is in a
crisis situation, of which the War is
only one part; or all the major prob-
lems facing the country, there is not
one that civilians are equipped to handle
as well as the military. Listen to his
reasoning as it came out in the course
at the interview. You may not like
everything he said, but you‘ll have a
much better idea of what is likely to
happen in south Vietnam in the
near future, and what isn’t.

He began by saying that the Con-
ltitution should be promulgated and an
elected government established as soon
as possible. He thought the first would
take a month and a half, and hoped

for the second within four to five
months after that.

Questions and answers follow. with
commentary in parentheses.

Q. General Thieu, are you satisfied
with the present draft of the Consti-
tution, or do you feel the legislative
alid judicial branches have been given
too much power? will South Vietnam
need a stronger executive?

A. Well you know, some members of
the Constituent Assembly Want to run
too fast toward democracy. 1 think in
general the Constitution is taking shape
well, but some parts of the draft are
not realistic toward the real situation
of the country. But we are continually
talking With the Assembly members,
and I think there will be time to ex-
plain to them and have these parts
changed.

(Score one for the military: super-
vising the drafting of a civil Consti-
tution, Talks between the junta and the
Assembly have in fact been going on
for some time. They began when it
looked like the two groups might clash
over controversial Article'ZO of Decree
Law 11, which gives the generals the
prerogative of amending the Assembly's
Constitution unless overridden by a two-
thirds vote.

Junta pressing Assembly?

General Thieu's comment underscores
another question which has puzzled oi»
servers here for some time: is the
junta bringing pressure on the Assembly
members to get objectionalbe sections
changed, or is the compromising mu-
tually amicable? The importance of the
question lies in the fact that the As-
senibly’s slowly rising public stature
derives largely from its independent,
almost defiant posture toward the mil-
itary government. if it comes out that
collusion or pressure is involved, the
new Constitution may be politically
dead before the ink is dry.)

Q. What parts of the draft are you
referring to, specifically?

A. Primarily the election of province
chiefs. This is democratic and ideal<
istic, but it is not practical for the
present time of war, or for many years
after the war. The province chiefs will
have to be appointed by the executive
and coordinated through the central
government. We are a small country,
you know, and we cannot afford in-
dependent states with elected governors
like you have. . . .For some time more
we will need to maintain army officers
as province chiefs. This is a difficult
job, and it requires a man of action,
a military man. A

(Score two {or the military: province
administration.)

Progress of war

i asked a series of questions about
the progress of the war. General Thieu
replied, “it is Very clear that for a
year the Viet Cong have had no mo-
mentum. They have no more hope of
winning large battles such as in 1964
and 1965. They won’t seize any prov-
inces. They are still infiltrating, of
course, but we can handle this problem."

(Score three for the generals: defeatr
ing the virulent wily Cong.)

Q. General Thieu, there has been
much talk of peace in recent weeks.
Do you see any chance for a nego—
tiated settlement at the present tithe?
Are there any circumstances under
which the government or South Vietnam
might enter into peace’ talks with Hanoi
or the NLF?

A. We have to be frank and just. We

have been at war for 20 years. The
reason we are fighting, and the reason
America is fighting with us, is that
we do not want a Communist invasmn.
But we want peace, we want South
Vietnam to be quiet. We would accept
a just and honorable peace, if Hanoi
would stop its invasion. But there are
no signs yet that Hanoi wants peace.
They are still convinced they can win
—not so much militarily now. but po-
litically. So i see no move toward
peace yet. Remember too, they may
be under pressure from China to con
tinue the war, even if l-ianol might
want peace.

Possib es of peace?

Q. But General Thieu, there seem
to be signs now that Ho Chi Minh
might settle for less than a victory. it
is well known that Russian supplies ior
North Vietnam have been stopped at
the Chinese border, and the recent
chaos in China may mean that China
will no longer be able to pressure
Hanoi into continuing the war. A news
paper report yesterday cited North
Vietnamese sources in Hong Kong as
saying that Ho Chi Minh no longer
feels he can win the war and is look~
ing for a possible negotiated peace, in
which the National Liberation Front
might have the minor share of a co-
alition government. Would terms like
these be acceptable to South Vietnam?

A. Up to now we do not recognize
the possibility of the NLF as a po-
liticai entity in a Coalition government.
When Hanoi is feeling weak, then it
will withdraw its forces, and then I
believe the NLF will collapse. They are
not strong enough to Continue fighting
by themselves.

Military role in future?

Q. Suppose a future civilian govern-
ment were to seek peace negotiations?
Would the military feel compelled to
prevent it?

A. We do not feel a coalition govern-
ment would be acceptable to the Vlet<
namese people, All people in South
Vietnam -- students, politicians, all of
them _ are afraid of a coalition govern-
ment because our political structure is
not yet strong enough to counter the
political forces or the Viet Cong organ-
ization. We are not well enough organ.
ized.

(It is true that South Vietnam’s non-
Commuuist political structure is frail
— fragmented, disorganized, faction-
ridden and propped up by a host of
vested interests. It is also true that many
Vietnamese nationalists would sincerely
like to strengthen it beiore a peace
is signed, in order to prevent a Viet
Cong political tour de iorcc.

it is patently untrue, on the other
hand, that no South Vietnamese would
accept a negotiated peace and a co-
alition government, Even among those
who have no sympathy for the Viet
Cong. there is growing feeling that the
war must be stopped. Some students,
religious leaders and politician-intel-
lecturals have said privately in recent
weeks that they are willing to take
their chances with peace and politics,
knowing full well that the Viet Cong
have the single strongest political ma-
chine in the country.

But the army is intransigent, and tho
generals still hold the cards. If the
v.5. ever decides it wants to negotiate
in Vietnam, it will have to persuade
the junta as well as Ho Chi Minh and
the NLF. So score four for the military“
arbitratmg a “just and honorable"
peace.)

Friday. March I1, Ivor

Q. General Thieu, how long do you
think it will take to organize political
parties that may stand up to the Viet
Cong?

A. That will be a very long pro
cess — perhaps ten years. You must
remember that we have never had an
opportunity to organize democratic par-
ties in Vietnam (He cited conditions
under the French, Diem, etc.) But we
cannot have a true democracy without
strong political parties. One of the jobs
of the future government should be to
help parties to organize and strengthen
themselves. The only parties we have
now are very old and fragmented.

Problems of new government

Q. Do you mean to imply that the
army might serve as a possible base
for one of the strong political parties
you envision?

A. i am against political parties in
the army. (in the other hand, if any
retired military men wanted to organ-
ize a party using other retired army
men, that might be good. Army dis-
cipline would give them a strong
organization.

(Score five for the military: provid-
ing a skeleton on which to hang a
fleshrandrblood political party. Though
the idea may be repugnant to Ameri-
cans, the alternatives for non-Commw
nist Vietnamese are just not that hope
ful at the present juncture. Both Ameri-
can oliicials and Vietnamese general!
are paying close attention to Korea’:
experiment with soldiersrturned-politi-
ticians. What an army party might do
is force the fragmented groups of cl-
vilian nationalists into forming one
large party of their own. Nothing else
has brought them together.)

Q. What problems will loom largest
for the new government when it take:
over next fall, General Thieu?

A. Their problems will be the same
as ours: defense and security, pacifi-
cation, refugees, the Open Arm pro-
gram Many of these will require
military management. Soldiers are more
qualified to handle them than civilians
would be, Civilians would have no
cadres, no trained leaders, no resources
for rural reconstruction. In a crisis
situation, the nation must depend on
the military. For example, when the
situation turned bad under Diem, he
had to call on the army. It is the
same now.

"War has been interesting"

Q. General Thieu, how have the gen-
erals of the Directory reacted to carry-
ing the responsibilities of the nation
for almost two years? Are they tired,
would they like to return to strictly
military duties, or do they enjoy serv-
ing in this capacity?

A. (with a laugh) Well, we are not
tired -« I have been fighting all my
life. It's been very interesting ~ the
direction of the country in wartime -
and we’re Very encouraged with the
results.

(No comment. Score as many as you
like for the military.)

General Thieu is right. The army can
do many things that civilians in Viet-
nam are neither equipped nor prepared
to do. The one thing that the generals
can not do is win the enthusiastic sup
port of the people. That being the case,
the View from here is that this frus‘
trating war, supported by no one ex<
cept those who are fighting is likely
to continue in its present vein until
either the Viet Cong or the ARVN run
out of foreign support.

ADDRESS HERE:

oEaIIOD lIGGUEJD
suernviea siiqnd

 

